The Dark Side

The Dark Side (2008) is journalist Jane Mayer’s historical analysis of the United States’ “War on Terror” campaign. Using the wealth of knowledge obtained from covering the War on Terror for The New Yorker, Mayer interprets the campaign as propaganda-fueled exploitation of public sentiment following the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon. Using primary and secondary sources, including examples of blatant public disinformation and instances of human rights violations at Guantanamo Bay, Mayer shows how the Bush administration strategically stoked the fires of xenophobia and militant nationalism to achieve specific political ends. Mayer argues that the Bush administration made an unprecedented attempt to stretch the limits of the executive branch’s powers. Receiving both praise and fierce criticism, the book has been factually corroborated in the years since its publication. It has inspired further research on the U.S. government’s misconduct in the wake of the terrorist attacks.

Mayer first turns to the weekend directly after 9/11, when the Bush administration was busy formulating its initial reaction to the tragedy. Vice President Dick Cheney appeared on Meet the Press, a prominent television network, and spoke candidly about the United States’ plan to utilize the “dark side” of its geopolitical toolset to retaliate against al-Qaeda. Indeed, in the years after 9/11, the United States implemented a systematic state torture program that included waterboarding, sexual violence, sleep deprivation, and other physical and psychological methods. The program was touted as a proactive campaign to use “any means necessary” to obtain information about past, present, and future terrorist activity. Mayer notes that the lengths the United States went to conceal and deny some of its anti-terror measures ran counter to Cheney’s populist statement in the 9/11 aftermath.

Next, Mayer discusses the ways state leaders handled the War on Terror. She argues that while George Bush had little experience managing foreign affairs, Dick Cheney was both adept in this domain and equipped with a long-standing agenda. Cheney, believing that the executive branch had been stripped of too much power ever since the Watergate scandal in the 1970s, sought to increase its influence over international relations relative to the judicial and legislative branches. Mayer names another man in charge of popularizing the War on Terror: David Addington. Addington, Cheney’s chief legal counsel, was a veteran of the Reagan administration. His expertise was in the art of weakening the power of targeted legislation. He and Cheney were the White House’s best instruments for the War on Terror.



Some of the power behind the War on Terror was institutional. Mayer singles out the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an obvious and effective proponent. The CIA advocated for the execution of suspected terrorists without due process. It also argued that it should be able to carry out domestic espionage despite an abundance of laws stating the exact opposite. Mayer argues that the War on Terror had no single mastermind; rather, its responsibilities were distributed throughout many government institutions. She points out several instances in American history where residents threatened civil liberties: among them are the Japanese concentration camps under Roosevelt, and Lincoln’s attempt to revoke the right to habeas corpus. What was unique about the Bush administration, she argues, was that it went to great lengths to argue that the President of the United States could exert ultimate decision-making power over any part of the government.

Other players include John Yoo of the Office of Legal Counsel, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. While Yoo helped legitimize the executive branch’s power grab, Rice and Powell’s offices were neutral or resistant to it, but largely ignored. Mayer underscores the fact that Cheney, Addington, and Yoo had little counterterrorism experience. Their fervent involvement points to the likely existence of ulterior motives and their general propensity to violate human rights norms.

Because many in the Bush administration have rejected the incriminating claims that Mayer makes in The Dark Side, the book has been taken as a partisan book. Nevertheless, the book is a powerful and well-researched rebuke of the War on Terror.