Philosophical Investigations

Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein is an unfinished manuscript translated by G.E. Anscombe and published posthumously in 1953. Wittgenstein describes different arguments and problems with the nature of language and ultimately lands on the fact that language is too fluid to be analyzed in any certain terms and should, instead, be described.

The manuscript is divided into two parts, the "remarks" and "Part II," though in later editions they are called "Philosophical Investigations" and "Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment." Rather than posing a philosophical problem and then relaying its solution, Wittgenstein's philosophy follows more of Socrates's maieutic method in which he creates a dialogue with the reader. He poses an idea, explores it, then discards or upholds it while voicing the arguments the reader may be making.

Wittgenstein begins with a quote from Augustine on the nature of language and how it is learned. A word correlates with an object, and then the object defines the word. This method works well with common and proper nouns, but any other word must "take care of itself."



Wittgenstein explains that the way a word is used is more important than the meaning of the word. For example, when you ask someone to fetch "five red apples," the person associates the word "apple" with the object he or she is familiar with, "red" with a color on a chart, and then counts to five. The meaning of the word "five" doesn't matter so long as the person can count out the apples.

Language is more complicated than an association between a word and the object it describes, but Wittgenstein creates an example to illustrate Augustine's definition. A builder and his assistant communicate using a four-word language consisting only of "block," "pillar," "slab," and "beam." The assistant learns the associations and then brings the builder what he needs using the limited language. A problem arises when we consider words such as "game" in relation to a board game. Not every game is a board game, but the word doesn't correlate with just one object either, as it could be several different kinds of board games. Thus, only some language complies with Augustine's description.

When learning a language, often we use the tactic of the builders, called "ostension," where we point out objects and say the corresponding word. A prevailing theory is that the association is then made by the word evoking an image of the object in the learner's mind.



While ostension is a part of language learning, Wittgenstein argues that it cannot function on its own. For example, if part of a machine, like a lever, is only identified by the way it works within the device, it is nothing out of that context. Language requires a social context to work.

Wittgenstein changes his example of the primitive builder's language to include "there” and "this," which allows the assistant to carry out tasks that are more complex. Instead of merely taking "slab" to the builder, he can take it to a specified area. He compares the idea that all words signify something to the notion that all tools change something. A hammer changes the position of a nail, and the nail makes the box more solid.

He points out that even with "this" and "there," a language is incomplete. All language is ever growing. Older language is like a maze and newer (more scientific) language is more like a suburb. Because of this growth, Wittgenstein says that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.



He introduces us to the different kinds of sentences and how they correlate. There are the corresponding, interrogative, imperative, and declarative sentences, though these are subject to change as language evolves.

Wittgenstein discusses Plato's theory that names signify "simples" from which everything else is built. Things that are impossible to describe must first be named, and language is built around it. Rather than trying to explain what simples are, Wittgenstein claims that no matter what object you find, there is always something simpler. A chair is simple, but not as simple, but when you consider that it is composed of wood and the wood is made up of atoms, it doesn't seem so simple anymore.

Likewise, Wittgenstein has given up his previous search for the "general form of all prepositions and of language" because it is impossible to find one common element in language. The word "game" cannot be cross-referenced among all language, as all games are different and have different qualities. All games have a "family resemblance" in that they share one common feature. Language, in this way, is not rigid.



Using the word "game" gives the user and the listener an idea of the intended meaning even though it isn't precise. Even without using the word "game," the definition can be expressed by giving examples and using analogies.

Wittgenstein argues that language cannot be interpreted through formal logic because the rules and meanings are not fixed. If we try to see language through the scope of logic, we risk seeing language as inferior. Instead, logicians should attempt to clarify misunderstandings that arise from using words through analysis.

While there is nothing wrong with vague sentences, it can be akin to locking a man in a room and leaving the door open, to which Wittgenstein queries: is an enclosure with a hole as good as no enclosure at all? Without rules, you still have a game, but an imperfect one.



Logic is still necessary because multiple viewpoints are needed for the investigation of language in the same way that you would describe chess by both its physical pieces and its rules to thoroughly understand it.

Instead of explaining language, Wittgenstein says we must only describe it. Philosophical explanations cannot be found because "philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" and the limits of language that he uncovers during his description help him "see the value of the discovery."