Charlie Wilson's War

Charlie Wilson’s War, also subtitled The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History, is a 2003 novel by George Crile III. It covers the background of U.S. Representative Charlie Wilson and his role in giving assistance to the allied Afghan Mujahideen during the period of the Soviet war that took place in Afghanistan. This operation was critical in leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Touting it as the biggest and most fruitful CIA campaign of all time, Crile’s novel is known for its focus on how political agency was enacted in the shadows of the United States government.

The book begins with a prologue in 1993, when Charlie Wilson, a 60-year-old congressman, travels to Langley, which houses the CIA headquarters, to accept an award. After the CIA director gives a bizarre speech praising Wilson for his lack of elitism, the author comments on its incongruity: only a decade before, Wilson had been perceived as a corrupt, cocaine abusing, scandal-prone man who frequently fended off allegations of sexual assault. Meanwhile, a man named Gust Avrakotos watches in the audience, enjoying no recognition though he is Wilson’s right-hand man.

The narrative then rewinds to 1980. Congressman Charlie Wilson departs to Las Vegas for a weekend to help increase the chance of a fundraiser’s daughter getting a part she wants in a film, and also to meet the backer of a TV show he has invested in. After a whirlwind of interactions, he ends up in a hot tub in a suite at a fancy hotel with two women and a large amount of cocaine. This incident, later investigated by the FBI, almost leads to the end of his political career. Meanwhile, the political situation with the Soviet Union is in free fall.



The trigger to Charlie Wilson’s involvement in political interactions with the Soviets and Afghanistan was a report by a 60 Minutes newscaster, Dan Rather, in which he sneaks across the Pakistani border into the war zone. He concludes that the CIA’s support to the Afghans was almost useless, having equipped them with obsolete weapons and resources. A fellow Texan, Wilson is galvanized by this report, which documented the toughness and persistence of the Afghani men.

This asymmetrical situation reminding him of the battle of the Alamo in Texas, and feeling provoked by the perceived inaction of president Carter, Wilson decides to take his own action. He calls the Appropriations Committee and orders them to double the funding to the Afghans. He spends the following years working diligently to use his political power under the radar, most of it not truly authorized, to increase funding to this foreign group.

By the late 1980s, the CIA had essentially created a well-trained 150,000-person Afghan militia, experts in destructive forms of warfare including homemade bombs. The United States would go on to continue funding the Afghan rebels long after the Soviet Union withdrew. Wilson kept these subsidies flowing despite intelligence that one of their main leaders unionized with Saddam Hussein in the Middle East’s Gulf War.



In 1991 and 1992, despite receiving thousands of Iraqi weapons captured by the United States in the Gulf War, the rebels received another $200 million, an amount matched by Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously, the Berlin Wall was coming down and the Soviet Union was dissolving. Nevertheless, Wilson viewed the continued funding of the rebels as a larger war against communism, and continued to secure funding.

Crile notes that a question puzzling many Americans was why the Afghan people seem to harbor animosity towards them. He argues that it is not difficult to understand if one empathizes with the situation of Afghan veterans in the aftermath of the Soviet departure. The United States abruptly withdrew support, leaving them struggling against the prevailing oppressive religious doctrines that remained in their environment. The book argues that the Afghans’ anxiety was due in part to the unorthodox actions of Wilson and Avrakotos. The two were instrumental in transforming the U.S.’ flawed perception of the Afghans as freedom fighters into an even more flawed stereotype of violent religious radicals.

Crile notes also at how Wilson’s erratic behavior ended up helping to develop some violent political leadership. His most influential political affiliate was the Pakistani dictator Zia ul Haq, who realized early that he could manipulate Wilson into funding his own political ends. Responsible for executing the democratically elected leader who came before him, Zia developed a bond with Wilson, using his status as ally to provide a site for an Afghan operations center for the U.S. while obfuscating his nuclear weapons program operations. Wilson, in turn, enjoyed “princely” treatment whenever visiting the Middle East, as observed by the author, who at one point went on a trip with him.



Charlie Wilson’s War thus offers a second, more surreal look at the political operations and mechanisms of power that actually influence the evolution of nations. Crile’s book is lauded for offering a necessary perspective on the absurd personal life of United States politicians and how it usually translates into non-optimal political solutions under the guise of deliberation and sanity.